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1.  The role of reference time in the interpretation of indirect reports 
 
Ever since the seminal work in (Kamp 1979, Hinrichs 1981; 1986, Kamp and Rohrer 
1983, and Partee 1984), it has been generally held that temporal anaphora depends in part 
on the aspectual distinction between events and states. For example, consider Partee’s 
classic example in (1). Here, the times of the described events (i.e. John’s getting up, 
going to the window, raising the blind, going back to bed) correlate with the order of 
appearance,  i.e.  a  narrative  progression  is  invoked.  On  the  other  hand,  the  states 
described in (1) (i.e. being light out, not being ready to face the day, being depressed) 
hold throughout the described events, i.e. a narrative halt is invoked. 
 
(1)  John got up, went to the window, and raised the blind. It was light out. He pulled 
the blind down and went back to bed. He wasn’t ready to face the day. He was too 
depressed (Partee 1984: 253). 
  
  The narrative effects above motivate some notion of a context supplied “reference 
time”—i.e. the time or event to which the story has so far developed—which is provided 
by the antecedent discourse and with which a temporal element in the new sentence 
establishes a certain anaphoric relation. In particular, the following has been proposed in 
the literature on temporal anaphora: 
 
(2)  TEMPORAL LOCATION 
Whereas the truth conditions for an eventive sentence require that the described 
event occur within a reference time, the truth conditions for a stative sentence 
require that the described state hold throughout the reference time (Kamp 1979, 
Hinrichs 1981; 1986, Kamp and Rohrer 1983, and Partee 1984). 
(3)  UPDATE OF REFERENCE TIME
1 
  An eventive predicate updates the reference time to the duration of a consequent 
state of the described event (Moens and Steedman 1988; Webber 1988); a stative 
predicate does not update the reference time (Hinrichs 1981; 1986). 
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1 Partee (1984) proposes that eventive predicates updates the reference time to a time “immediately 
after” the described event and stative predicates update the reference time to the duration of the described 
state. The generalizations made in this paper do not depend on which version of the rule is chosen. (4)  REFERENCE TIME RESOLUTION
2 
Unless there exists contextual justification to the contrary, a described eventuality 
is—by default—located in time relative to the most recent reference time that is 
made salient in discourse (after Kamp and Reyle 1993: 545) 
 
Let  us  see  how  (2)-(4)  apply  to  the  discourse  in  (1).  Given  (3),  the  eventive 
predicate got up updates the reference time to a consequentstate of that event. Given the 
default condition in (4), this is the reference time relative to which the going to the 
window event is located in time. Finally, given (2), the going to the window event is 
contained within a consequent state of the getting up event. Applying the rules in this 
way, we also derive that the raising the blind event is contained within a consequent state 
of the going to the window event. On the other hand, the state of being light out contains 
(rather than being contained within) a consequent state of the raising the blind event 
given  (2)  and  the  default  condition  in  (4).  Moreover,  since  stative  predicates  do  not 
update  the  reference  time,  the  pulling  the  blind  down  event  is  contained  within  a 
consequent state of the raising the blind event given (2) and the default condition in (4)—
and  so  on;  see  Fig.  1,  where  the  underscore  lines  represent  a  consequent  state  of  a 
described event, which serves as the reference time in the interpretation of a clause. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Narrative effects in (1) 
 
The goal of this paper is to investigate narrative effects in indirect reports like 
(5b). These constructions consist of (i) a matrix clause that contains an indirect speech or 
an  attitude  verb  which  describes  an  eventuality  v1  and  (ii)  a  complement  clause  that 
contains a predicate which describes an eventuality v2.  
 
(5)  a.  V  prošlom godu v  bare ja do-li-l                   bakal Dudkina i  
           In last         year  at bar   I  PFV-pour-PST.1s glass  Dudkin  and           
       ‘Last year, at a bar, I filled up Dudkin’s glass and     
  b.  skaza-l,            čto  ja xote-l         emu  soobščit'   čto-to         prijatnoe. 
             
PFVsay-PST.1s that I   wantIPF-PST.1s  him  announce  something pleasant 
  said that I wanted to inform him of something pleasant.’ 
 
                                                 
2 This rule is not meant to capture the complex nature of reference time resolution, which is intimately 
connected  with  the  rhetorical  structure  of  discourse.  It  merely  states  a  default  condition  that  may  be 
overridden.  
    J gets up ● _____________________ 
    J goes to window ●____________________  
      J raises the blind ●___________________ 
                                    It is light out …/////////////////////////////////////////////////////… 
                                  J pulls the blind down ●______________ 
 I argue that (2)-(4) play a crucial role in the temporal ordering of v1 and v2 analogous to 
unembedded  eventualities  in  discourse  viz.  (1).  Although  the  core  data  comes  from 
Russian, the generalizations made in this paper presumably apply to other languages as 
well. Russian is chosen in order to address the following question, which has not received 
a  satisfactory  answer  in  the  literature:  when  do  Russian  indirect  reports  have  an 
interpretation  in  which  the  eventualities  described  by  the  embedded  and  the  matrix 
predicate overlap in time (henceforth: overlapping interpretation)? 
  Returning to the discourse in (5) above, notice that the following inferences are 
made: (i) the speaker’s report described in (5b) is understood to follow the glass event 
described in (5a) and (ii) the wanting to inform state described in (5b) holds at the time of 
the glass filling event and continues to hold throughout the speaker’s report. The rules in 
(2)-(4) predict the following about the temporal order of the eventualies described in (5). 
Given (3), the reference time in (5a) is updated to a consequent state of the filling up 
event. Given the default condition in (4), this is the reference time in the matrix clause of 
(5b). What about the reference time in the embedded clause? The default condition in (4) 
tells us that it is a consequent state of the saying event. Given (2), the wanting to inform 
state  holds  throughout  this  consequent  state,  while  the  saying  event  holds  within  a 
consequent state of the glass filling event. As result, we account for the fact that (5b) 
entails that the eventualities described by the matrix and the embedded clause overlap in 
time; however, we do not account for the inference that the state of wanting to inform 
holds at the time of the glass filling event: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Figure 2: Narrative effects in (5) given the default condition in (4) 
 
  One could say that world knowledge about the typical duration of a wanting state 
accounts for this inference (cf. Dowty 1986 and Gennari 2003).  Alternatively, one could 
say that the default condition in (4) is overridden: the embedded predicate “disregards” 
the reference time update of the eventive matrix verb in (5b) and “chooses” the reference 
time  that  is  updated  by  a  preceding  eventive  predicate  in  (5a).  On  such  a  view,  the 
reference time in the embedded clause of (5b) would be the same as the reference time in 
the matrix clase. Given (2), the saying event would hold within a consequent state of the 
filling up event and the wanting to inform state would holds throughout it: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Narrative effects in (5) given an override of the default condition in (4)  
   
speaker fills up glass  ● _____________ 
              speaker says p   ●_______  
           p: speaker wants to inform…//////////////////// 
speaker fills up glass  ● _____________ 
             speaker says p   ●_______  
      p: speaker wants to inform //////////////////////////////////////////////////// Potential evidence that the embedded predicate in (5b) does, in fact, “disregard” 
the reference time update of the eventive matrix verb comes from (6) and (7).  
 
(6)  a.  V   prošlom godu  Dudkin razve-l-sja                           s       ženoj. 
    In  last         year   Dudkin 
PFVseperate-PST.3s-REFL with  wife 
    ‘Last year Dudkin divorced his wife.’ 
  b.  #On by-l                sčastlivym xolostjakom. 
      He  beIPF-PST.3s happy        bachelor 
    ‘He was a happy bachelor. 
(7)  a.  V   prošlom godu Dudkin  razve-l-sja                           s      ženoj. 
    In  last         year  Dudkin  
PFVseperate-PST.3s-REFL with wife 
    ‘Last year Dudkin divorced his wife.’ 
  b.         #Ja slyša-l,              čto  on  by-l               sčastlivym xolostjakom. 
      I   
PFVhear-PST.1s that he  beIPF-PST.3s happy        bachelor 
    ‘I heard that he was a happy bachelor.’   
 
The  continuation  in  (6b)  is  infelicitous  because  asserting  that  Dudkin  was  a  happy 
bachelor at the time of his divorce is absurd. And as illustrated in (7b), embedding (6b) 
under  an  attitude  does  not  improve  the  infelicitous  status  of  the  discourse.  This 
observation is mysterious if assume that the reference time in the embedded clause is 
revolved to a consequent state of the hearing event desribed by (7b). On the other hand, 
this observation is expected if we assume that the default condition in (4) is overridden in 
indirect reports: the embedded predicate “disregards” the reference time update of the 
eventive  matrix  verb  in  (7b)  and  “chooses”  the  reference  time  that  is  updated  by  a 
preceding eventive predicate in (7a). 
  A question that arises, then, is: what is responsible for the override of the default 
condition in (4)? One hypothesis would be to say that the past tense on the embedded 
predicate  is  responsible  for  the  override;  it  ensures  that  the  reference  time  in  the 
embedded clause precedes the time of the event described by the matrix clause. This 
hypothesis is addressed in §3.2. For the time being I will follow Kamp and Reyle (1993) 
and  assume  that  we  can  identify  the  reference  time  in  a  given  clause  based  on  our 
intuitions about the temporal ordering of eventualities—e.g. we know that a consequent 
state of the glass filling event is the reference time in the embedded clause of (5b) since 
we understand the wanting to inform state to hold before the filling up the glass event 
(and continuing to hold throughout this event). 
  Let us now consider the indirect report in (8b), which is identical to (5b) but has a 
different  interpretation  due  to  the  surrounding  discourse.  Here,  an  overlapping 
interpretation is not entailed (though it is compatible with 8b)—e.g. the speaker’s desire 
to inform  Dudkin of something pleasant may never have ceased or this desire may have 
ceased shortly before the time of his report.  
 
(8)  a.  Včera        Lev menja sprosi-l:         “Počemu ty    reši-l                pojti               
      Yesterday Lev me      
PFVask-PST.3s why       you decide-PST.2s
 PFVgo.INF  
      v bar  s      Dudkinym?” 
      to bar with Dudkin 
      ‘Yesterday Lev asked me: “Why did you decide to go to the bar with Dudkin.”’   b.  Ja skaza-l,           čto  ja xote-l         emu  soobščit'   čto-to         prijatnoe. 
             I   
PFVsay-PST.1s that I  wantIPF-PST.1s  him   announce  something pleasant 
    ‘I said that I wanted to inform him of something pleasant.’ 
 
Given (3), the reference time in (8a) is first updated to a consequent state of the speaker’s 
asking, then to a consequent state of hearer’s decision. However, the saying event in (8b) 
is understood to be located in time relative to the former consequent state, not the latter. 
After all, answers follow rather than precede the question to which they correspond to. 
For example, consider the discourse in (9). Here, Obama’s reply is understood to follow 
the question asking rather than the havoc raising. 
 
(9)  The reporter asked a provoking question to Obama. It raised havoc all around the 
country. I wonder why. After all, the candidate replied as best as he could. 
 
Therefore, I assume that the reference time in the matrix clause of (8b) is resolved to a 
consequent  state  of  the  speaker’s  asking  in  (8a)  due  to  extra-linguistic  reasoning 
analogous to (9). What about the reference time in the embedded clause of (8b)? Since 
we understand the wanting state to hold during the decision to go to the bar, the reference 
time in the embedded clause of (8b) is a consequent state of the decision. Given (2), the 
saying event thus holds within a consequent state of the asking, while the wanting to 
inform state holds throughout a consequent state of the decision. As result, it is correctly 
predicted that (8b) does not entail that the eventualities described by the matrix and the 
embedded clause overlap in time: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Narrative effects in (8) do not trigger an overlapping interpretation 
 
In  sum,  we  have  seen  that  when  an  embedded  clause  of  an  indirect  report  is 
stative and the reference time overlaps the time of the matrix eventuality, an overlapping 
interpretation is entailed. This generalization automatically follows from (2). However, it 
is quite different from what has been proposed in the literature on (Russian) indirect 
reports. Previous researchers have addressed the question of what allows an embedded 
eventuality to overlap in time with a matrix eventuality by appealing to properties of 
grammatical elements such as tense, aspect and verb. In the next section, I attempt to 
show  how  some  of  the  previous  generalizations—although  incorrect—raise  some 
interesting  questions  about  the  temporal  interpretation  of  indirect  reports  that  require 
further research. Subsequently, in §3, I consider what narrative effects in indirect reports 
reveal about the meaning of the past tense. I present novel data and argue that a standard 
theory which holds that the past tense requires a reference time to precede the local 
evaluation time cannot be right if by “reference time” we mean the topical interval of 
time  previously  introduced  in  discourse  that  accounts  for  narrative  progression. 
Moreover, I argue that a theory of tense that assumes a richer ontology of times—such as 
Lev asks  ● _____________ 
                                 speaker decides ●_________               
         speaker says p   ●_______                                                                                    
                     p: speaker wants to inform /////////////////////////////////…   
 the one in Kamp and Reyle 1993—could be extended to account for the indirect report 
indirect report data that the standard theory of tense cannot.  
 
2.  Previous research on Russian indirect reports 
 
Forbes  (1914)  argued  that  Russian  indirect  reports  allow  an  overlapping 
interpretation only if embedded tense is non-past. This generalization has independently 
resurfaced in much of the literature on this topic (e.g., Comrie 1985; 1986, Kondrashova 
1999; 2006, Kusumoto 1999, Schlenker 2003; 2004, von Stechow 2003, Hollebrandse 
2005, and Babyonyshev and Matushansky 2006). While this generalization is false (see 5 
and data in §5), it is surprising that so many researchers have concluded from indirect 
reports  that  are  similar  to  those  provided  in  the  previous  section—albeit  without  a 
supporting context—that an overlapping interpretation is not possible with the embedded 
past tense. The question then, is: what (if anything) does this reveal about the temporal 
properties  of  these  constructions?  A  natural  hypothesis  is  to  say  that  by  default,  the 
reference time in the embedded clause of an indirect report precedes the reference time in 
matrix clause. This hypothesis, along with the implicative nature of the past tense, could 
possibly explain why past researchers have (incorrectly) generalized from out-of-the-blue 
indirect reports that an overlapping interpretation is not possible with the embedded past 
tense. Future research will hopefully shed light on whether such a hypothesis is correct. 
In contrast to the aforementioned researchers, Khomitsevich (2008) argues that an 
overlapping interpretation is possible only if the embedded predicate is imperfective.
3 
However,  Khomitsevich  does  not  say  why  only  the  imperfective  should  allow  an 
overlapping interpretation and why an overlapping interpretation is often not possible 
with this aspect (viz. 8). Moreover, as illustrated in (10), an overlapping interpretation is, 
in  fact,  possible  with  an  embedded  perfective  predicate  when  it  recieves  a  habitual 
interpretation. Here, Alexey’s habit of never giving in is understood to hold (though need 
not be instantiated) at the time of the knowing. 
 
(10)  Ona zna-l-a,                       čto  v  situacijax,  sxodnyx     s        segodnjašnej,  
She knowIPF-PST.3s-FEM that in situations  prevailing  from  today               
Aleksej nikogda ne   ustup-it. 
Alexey never     not  
PFVgive.in-NPST.3s 
‘She knew that in such situations as that prevailing today, Aleksey never gave in.’ 
(Aksenov, Kollegi; Forsyth 1970: 178) 
 
This  is  not  surprising  if  we  assume  following  Bittner  2008  that  analogous  to  stative 
sentences, the truth conditions for a habitual sentence require that the described habit 
contain the reference time. Since both the imperfective and the perfective aspect give rise 
to the habitual interpretation (Jakobson 1971; see also Stunová 1986) neither aspect is a 
necessary condition for an overlapping interpretation. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that Boeck (1957) and Costello 1960/1) have 
argued that Russian indirect reports with an embedded past tense allow an overlapping 
                                                 
3 This conclusion is independently reached for indirect reports in Romance (see Giorgi and Pianesi 
1997; 2000 for Italian and Gennari 2001 for Spanish); see also Hollebrandse 2005 for more discussion. interpretation as long as the matrix verb is an attitude as opposed to an indirect speech 
verb.  These  authors  conclude  that  it  is  not  the  tense  or  the  aspect  of  the  embedded 
predicate that is responsible for an overlapping interpretation (or the lack thereof), but 
rather the semantic properties of matrix verb.
4 While this generalization is also false (see 
5 and data in §5), it is unclear at this point what it reveals about the temporal properties 
of indirect reports.
5 
 
 
3. The role of the past tense in the interpretation of indirect reports 
 
3.1. Predictions of the standard theory  
  
In this section I would like to consider what indirect reports like (11b)—which crucially 
differ  from  (5b)/(8b)  in  that  the  embedded  predicate  is  eventive  (viz.  the  perfective 
marking on the embedded verb)—reveal about the meaning of the past tense. Here the 
following inferences are made: (i) Anna’s report described in (11b) follows the murder 
described in (11a) and (ii) the running away event described in (11b) follows the murder. 
 
(11)  a. Dudkin  soverši-l                  ubijstvo v  tom zdanii.                        
    Dudkin  
PFVcommitt-PST.3s murder  in that building  
    ‘Dudkin committed murder in that building.’ 
b. Mne Anja  skazala,            čto  on  u-beža-l               s       aktrisoj. 
    Me   Anna 
PFVsay-PST.3s  that he  PFV-run-PST.3s with  actress 
  ‘Anna told me that he ran away with an actress.’ 
 
The rules in (2)-(4) predict the following about the temporal order of the eventualies 
described in (11). Given (3), the reference time in (11a) is updated to a consequent state 
of the murder. Given the default condition in (4), this is the reference time in the matrix 
clause of (11b). This is also the reference time in the embedded clause of (11b) since we 
understand the running away event to follow the murder described in (11a). Given (2), the 
saying and the running away events are contained in a consequent state of the murder. 
But how do we account for the intuition that the running away precedes the saying event? 
In order to see what the standard theory of tense—which says that the past tense 
requires a reference time to precede the local evaluation time—predicts, let us assume 
that the tenseless sentence on ubegat’ (‘he run away’) has the denotation in (12) and the 
past tense has the denotation in (13). Note that I adopt the following conventions: (i) τ is 
a trace function assigning to eventualities in its domain their run time (Link 1987), (ii) t0 
refers to the speech time when free, or the attitude holder’s now when bound by the 
complementizer (Abusch 1997, Heim 1994, and von Stechow 1995; 2003) and (iii) a free 
time variable tR
n refers to a reference time r, which is a topical interval of time inherited 
from the context in which the sentence is interpreted. 
 
                                                 
4 See also Forsyth 1970, Brecht 1975, Barensten 1996, Altshuler 2004, and Khomitsevich 2008. 
5 It may worthwhile to note, however, that Brasoveanu and Farkas (2007) have recently claimed that 
attitude and indirect speech reports have different anaphoric properties. Unfortunately, the authors do no 
say whether the observed differences affect the temporal interpretation of these constructions.  (12)  on ubegat’   k      λt1λw1[∃e1[run.away(he)(e1)(w1) ∧ τ(e1) ⊆ t1]] 
(13)  PST
1    k   λRiωtλw1[tR
1 < t0 ∧ R(tR
1)(w1)] 
 
If we assume that the embedded past tense in (11b) is deictic—i.e. t0 refers to the speech 
time—then (11b) would have the denotation (14), where the argument of skazat’ (‘say’) 
is a set of worlds: 
 
(14)  PST
1 Anja skazat’ čto PST
2 on ubegat’ k 
         λw1[∃e1[tR
1 < t0 ∧ say(λw2[∃e2[tR
2 < t0 ∧ run.away(he)(e2)(w2)  
      ∧ τ(e2) ⊆ tR
2]])(anna)(e1)(w1) ∧ τ(e1)  ⊆ tR
1]] 
 
If, on the other hand, we assume that embedded past tense in (11b) is bound—i.e. t0 refers 
to the attitude holder’s now rather than the speech time—then (11b) would have the 
translation in (15); the propositional argument of skazat’ (‘say’) is now a set of world-
time pairs (rather than a set of worlds): 
 
(15)  PST
1 Anja skazat’ čto PST
2 on ubegat’ k 
         λw1[∃e1[tR
1 < t0 ∧ say(λw2λt0[∃e2[tR
2 < t0 ∧ run.away(he)(e2)(w2)  
      ∧ τ(e2) ⊆ tR
2]])(anna)(e1)(w1) ∧ τ(e1)  ⊆ tR
1]] 
   
I will now show that both (14) and (15) are problematic given the following two 
assumptions:  
 
(16)   By “reference time” we mean the topical interval of time previously introduced in 
discourse that accounts for narrative progression.  
(17)   The identity of the reference time in the matrix and the embedded clause of (11b) 
is necessary to account for the intuition that the saying event and the running 
away event follow the murder described in (11a). 
 
I begin with (14). The reference time variables t R
1 and tR
2 could refer to the same or 
different reference times depending on the surrounding discourse. Assuming that they get 
assigned  the  same  value,  a  forward  shifted  interpretation
6  and  an  overlapping 
interpretation
7 are wrongly predicted to be possible; Fig. 5 illustrates the two temporal 
ordering of events that are compatible with (14). 
                                                 
6 Abusch (1997) rules a forward-shifted interpretation via the Upper Limit Constraint (Abusch 1997: 
23-25). 
7 It has been argued by Kusumoto (1999; 2005) that in English, an overlapping interpretation is possible 
when  the  embedded  predicate  is  eventive.  If  such  were  the  case,  then  presumably  the  fact  that  an 
overlapping interpretation is not rule out would be a welcomed result (though of course one would still 
need to explain why the overlapping interpretation is not possible in 11b). Kusumoto provides the example 
in (i) and observes that it can correspond to the direct speech report “Ichiro strikes out”, as uttered by an 
announcer. 
(i)  The announcer said that Ichiro struck out (Kusumoto 2005: 324). 
Note, however, that when an announcer reports live sporting events, he uses the present tense so that the 
sports fan perceives the described event as “ongoing” even though it has already taken place—e.g. when an  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 5: two possible temporal ordering of events given (16) 
   
Let us us now consider (15) and make the standard assumption that the lexical 
semantics of an indirect speech (or attitude) verb ensures that time of the attitude holder’s 
report in the actual world is identified with the attitude holder’s now in some possible 
world.
8 Since the saying event holds within the reference time denoted by tR
1, while the 
reference time denoted by tR
2 precedes the counterpart of the saying time, namely the 
attitude holder’s now, filling in the same value for tR
1 and tR
2 leads to a contradiction. 
In sum, I have presented an argument against the standard theory of tense. This 
argument crucially relies on (16) and (17). While I take (16) to be well motivated, one 
could question the assumption in (17). However, in doing so, one must then find some 
other way to account for the temporal ordering of events described in (11b) relative to the 
event  described  in  (11a).  Instead  of  trying  to  rescue  the  standard  theory  in  this  way 
(which is a non-trivial task), I will consider why this theory fails given the assumptions 
(16) and (17). Its failure seems to be due to the fact that the reference is being asked to do 
too many things at once: not only is it being asked to account for narrative progression, 
but  it  is  also  being  asked  to  locate  the  described  eventuality  relative  to  the  local 
evaluation time (albeit indirectly). Based on data orthogonal to indirect reports, Kamp 
and  Reyle  (1993)  reach  a  similar  conclusion.  They  argue  that  the  “reference  time” 
encoded by the tense should not be held accountable for narrative progression. Only the 
“reference time” encoded by the aspect should have this function. In the next section, I 
briefly outline Kamp and Reyle’s motivations for such a view and extend their proposed 
analysis to indirect reports. I show that this analysis can account for the indirect report 
data considered thus far.  
 
 
3.2.  Kamp and Reyle’s analysis of the past tense extended to indirect reports   
 
Kamp and Reyle (1993) propose that the (simple) past tense is “…ambiguous between (at 
least) two different relation pairs. When the past tense sentence…[is eventive]…then its 
                                                 
announcer says “Ichiro strikes out”, he says this after Ichiro’s bat has gone through the strike zone—i.e. 
what he really means is “Ichiro has just struck out”. To the best of my knowledge, there are no convincing 
cases where an overlapping interpretation is possible when the embedded predicate is eventive (see e.g. 
Gennari 2003, Hollebrandse 2005, and Higginbotham 2006). This is especially clear in Russian, where an 
episodic perfective predicate in the embedded clause of an indirect report never allows an overlapping 
interpretation. 
8 This assumption is necessary since even if the attitude holder is clueless (or wrong) about what time it 
is, the bound t0 still represents his now and not his past or future. That is, the attitude holder does not 
believe himself to be living in the past or future of whatever time he may believe it to be (even if he has a 
false belief about what time it is). See Lewis 1979, and von Stechow 1995 for more discussion of this point. 
Dudkin commits murder  ● _______________ 
                       Anna says p   ●                            
 Interpretation #1:      p: Dudkin runs away  ●   (overlapping) 
 Interpretation #2:               p: Dudkin runs away   ● (forward-shifted) tense  always  corresponds  to  the  pair  <TPpt  coincides  with  utterance  time;  described 
eventuality before TPpt>. When…[the past tense sentence is stative]…the corresponding 
relations may be <TPpt before the utterance time; described eventuality overlaps TPpt>” 
(Kamp and Reyle: 597):
9 
 
(18)  a.  PST
1
Event   k  λPεωtλw1[∃e1[tP
1 = t0 ∧ τ(e1) < t P
1 ∧ P(e1)(w1)]] 
b.  PST
1
State    k  λRσωtλw1[∃s1[tP
1 < t0 ∧ tP
1 ∩ τ(s1) ≠ ∅ ∧ R(s1)(w1)]]  
 
Note that ‘TPpt’—represented as tP in the formulas above—corresponds to a perspective 
time (or temporal perspective point). But what is the nature of a perspective time? Due to 
space limitations, I will only outline one their motivations (see Kamp and Reyle 1993, 
Chap.  5.4  for  more  discussion)—which  is  independent  of  indirect  reports—and  then 
move on to consider some evidence that Kamp and Reyle provide for the view that the 
(simple) past tense is ambiguous viz. (18). 
  Ever  since  Reichenbach  1947,  it  has  been  generally  held  that  temporal 
interpretation is determined by relating (at least) three distinct times: the reference point 
(or reference time), the event time and the speech time. This view is made more fine-
grained in Kamp and Reyle 1993, where it is argued that: “Reichenbach went astray 
when he wanted his notion of reference point to do too many things at once.” Kamp and 
Reyle  observe  that  in  discourses  such  as  (19),  which  involve  the  so-called  extended 
flashback, all the past perfect clauses use the time of the arriving as their “reference 
point.”  However,  these  clauses  also  form  a  narrative  progression  and  therefore  each 
clause also provides a “reference point” for the clause following it—a time which the 
eventuality described by the second clause must follow or overlap. 
 
(19)  Fred arrived at 10. He had got up at 5; he had taken a long shower, had got 
dressed and had eaten a leisurely breakfast. He had left the house at 6:30 (Kamp 
and Reyle 1993: 594).    
 
To  account  for  the  temporal  ordering  in  (19),  Kamp  and  Reyle  propose  that 
Reichenbach’s notion “reference point” should be broken up into two distinct notions, 
which play entirely different roles. They write (Kamp and Reyle 1993: 594): 
 
(20)  “We propose to retain the term reference point for the type of reference time 
which accounts for narrative progression…For reference times that arise in two-
dimensional  analysis  of  the  past  perfect,  we  will  use  the  term  temporal 
perspective point…This term is meant to reflect our intuition that the intermediate 
time  which  Reichenbach  recognized  as  essential  to  the  interpretation  of  past 
perfects is the time from which the described eventuality is seen as past”.  
 
Thus in (19), Fred’s arrival is the perspective time relative to which all the events denoted 
by the past perfect predicates are located in time. Moreover, the narrative progression in 
                                                 
9 This is a grossly simplified version of Kamp and Reyle’s analysis of the simple past tense. It is 
presented as such for the sole purpose of deriving the indirect report data considered thus far. I refer the 
reader to Kamp and Reyle 1993, Chap. 5.4 for intricate details of their proposal.   is accounted for if we assume that the reference time of a past perfect predicate is updated 
to the duration of a consequent state of the described event (see Kamp and Reyle 1993: 
606-609 for a detailed description of the analysis). 
  Let us now consider some evidence that Kamp and Reyle provide for the view 
that the (simple) past tense is ambiguous viz. (18). They observe that in (21) and (22) the 
adverb now refers to a past interval of time, which serves as the perspective time for and 
in virtue of which the described eventualities (i.e. feeling at home and writing a letter 
respectively) are seen as past.
10 
 
(21)  Mary had been unhappy in her environment for more than a year. But now she felt 
at home (Kamp and Reyle 1993: 595). 
 
(22)  Bill had come home at seven. Now he was writing a letter (Kamp and Reyle 1993: 
596). 
 
In contrast to the examples above, (23) shows that now cannot modify eventive sentences 
in the past tense.
11  This contrast is also evident with e.g. the Russian sejčas (‘now’), the 
French  maintenant ( ‘now’)  and  the  Korean  cikum  (see  Lee  and  Choi  2009  for  more 
discussion). 
 
(23)  #Bill had come home at seven. Now he wrote a letter (Kamp and Reyle 1993: 
596). 
 
Assuming that now refers to the perspective time, the data above suggests that the 
perspective time for an eventive past tense sentence must coincide with the utterance 
time, while the perspective time for a stative past tense sentence may be some past time 
that is determined by the context, typically the run time of an event described previously 
in discourse. If this is right, then the relations between the perspective time and described 
eventuality imposed by the past tense must be the ones in (18): for eventive sentences, the 
described  eventuality  precedes  the  perspective  time  (i.e.  since  the  perspective  time 
coincides with the utterance time), while for stative sentences, the described eventuality 
                                                 
10 Some native speakers of English feel that (21) and (22) are marginal. However, when presented with 
more naturally occurring examples, such as (ii), these speakers have no problem accepting the fact that now 
can refer to a past interval of time. 
(ii)   The student-mistress was much younger than Sabina, and the musical composition of her life had 
scarcely been outlined; she was grateful to Franz for the motifs he gave her to insert. Franz’s 
Grand  March  was  now  her  creed  as  well.  Music  was  now  her  Dionysian  intoxication  (The 
Unbearable Lightness of Being; Milan Kundera).   
11 Perhaps more convincing contrasts are found in the following discourses: 
(iii)   He came to me and told me he had been dressing in my clothes whenever I wasn't home for quite a 
few years, and now he {was ready to take/taking/*took} the next step and with the help of his 
doctor…(internet) 
(iv)   Last month I met Bianca, an old friend whom I haven’t seen for so much time. But I was surprised 
to see how much has she changed. She was a quite well-built girl and now she… 
a.  ….was so skinny and her face was a little pale.   
b.   …*now she became skinny and her face became a little pale. 
c.   …now she had become skinny and her face had become a little pale. overlaps  the  perspective  time  (i.e.  since  the  perspective  time  precedes  the  utterance 
time).
12  
Let us now apply Kamp and Reyle’s analysis of tense to indirect reports. In doing 
so, I would like to make the following assumption: an embedded past tense is always 
bound. Given this assumption, let us reconsider the discourse in (11), repeated below in 
(24): 
 
(24)  a. Dudkin  soverši-l                  ubijstvo v  tom zdanii.                        
    Dudkin  
PFVcommitt-PST.3s murder  in that building  
    ‘Dudkin committed murder in that building.’ 
b. Mne Anja  skazala,            čto  on  u-beža-l               s       aktrisoj. 
    Me   Anna 
PFVsay-PST.3s  that he  PFV-run-PST.3s with  actress 
  ‘Anna told me that he ran away with an actress.’ 
 
Recall that (24) is a problem for the standard theory of tense because either it does not 
rule out non-existing interpretations or it derives a contradiction when the reference times 
in the matrix and the embedded clause are identified. On the other hand, as illustrated by 
(25)—which is the denotation of (24b)—assuming Kamp and Reyle’s meaning for the 
“eventive” past tense in (18a) allows us to rule out an overlapping interpretation even if 
the reference time in the matrix and the embedded clause is identical. Such is the case 
because the embedded “eventive” past tense requires the running away event to precede 
the attitude holder’s now; see Fig. 6. 
 
(25)   PST
1
event Anja skazat’
1 čto PST
2
event
 on ubegat’
2 k 
        λw1[∃e1[tP
1 = t0 ∧ τ(e1) < t P
1 ∧ say(λw2λt0[∃e2[tP
2 = t0 ∧ τ(e2) < t P
2  
      ∧ run.away(he)(e2)(w2) ∧ τ(e2) ⊆ tR
2]])(anna)(e1)(w1) ∧ τ(e1)  ⊆ tR
1]] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
          Figure 6: Narrative effects in (24) 
 
By requiring the described event to precede the attitude holder’s now, the embedded 
“eventive” past tense not only accounts for the fact that (24b) entails an non-overlapping 
interpretation, but it also prevents the described event from being located in time relative 
to a reference time that is updated by an indirect speech (or attitude) verb. In this way, the 
observation that the “eventive” past tense overrides the default condition in (4) is not 
                                                 
12 The view that tense is sensitive to the lexical properties of verbs has some cross-linguistic appeal. As 
argued  in  Baker  and  Travis  1998,  the  Mohawk  past  tense  morpheme  hne’  can  only  attach  to  stative 
predicates. Future research will hopefully reveal other languages where similar restrictions are found. 
              tR
1 = tR
2          t0 =tP
1
 (speech time)   
       
   Dudkin commits murder  ● _____________                    ● 
     t0 =tP
2
 (Anna’s now) 
                                         Anna says p  ●  
               p: Dudkin runs away ●   
 surprising, i.e. we account for the observation that the embedded predicate “disregards” 
the  reference  time  update  of  the  eventive  matrix  verb  in  (24b)  and  “chooses”  the 
reference time that is updated by a preceding eventive predicate in (24a). 
  I  conclude  this  section  by  showing  that  the  “stative”  past  tense  in  (18b)  is 
compatible with the temporal ordering of events in (5) and (8), repeated below in (26) 
and (27) respectively; the denotation of the indirect report in (26b)/(27b) is given in (28). 
 
(26)  a.  V  prošlom godu v  bare ja  do-li-l                   bakal Dudkina i  
           In last        year  at  bar   I   PFV-pour-PST.1s glass  Dudkin  and           
       ‘Last year, at a bar, I filled up Dudkin’s glass and     
  b.  skaza-l,           čto  ja xote-l                emu  sobščit'     čto-to        prijatnoe. 
             
PFVsay-PST.1s that I   wantIPF-PST.1s him  announce something pleasant 
  said that I wanted to inform him of something pleasant.’ 
 
(27)    a.  Včera       Lev  menja sprosi-l:       “Počemu  ty    reši-l                pojti               
      Yesterday Lev me      
PFVask-PST.3s why      you decide-PST.2s  
 PFVgo.INF  
      v bar  s      Dudkinym?” 
      to bar with Dudkin 
      ‘Yesterday Lev asked me: “Why did you decide to go to the bar with Dudkin.”’ 
  b.  Ja skaza-l,           čto  ja xote-l                emu  sobščit'     čto-to        prijatnoe. 
     I   
PFVsay-PST.1s that I  wantIPF-PST.1s  him  announce something pleasant 
  ‘I said that I wanted to inform him of something pleasant.’ 
 
(28)   PST
1
Event Dudkin skazat’
1 čto PST
2
State
 on xočit sobščit'
2 k 
        λw1[∃e1[tP
1 = t0 ∧ τ(e1) < t P
1 ∧ say(λw2λt0[∃s1[tP
2 < t0 ∧ tP
2 ∩ τ(s1) ≠ ∅ 
         ∧ want.to.inform(he)(s1)(w2) ∧ tR
2 ⊆ τ(s1)]])(dudkin)(e1)(w1) ∧ τ(e1)  ⊆ tR
1]] 
 
  Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 illustrate the contribution of the embedded “stative” past tense 
in (26b) and (27b) respectively. Note that I assume that the reference time in the matrix 
and the embedded clause of (26b) is the same (namely a consequent state of the glass 
filling event) and the perspective time in the embedded clause is the time of the glass 
filling event; the perspective time in the matrix clause is the speech time. In (27b), I 
assume that the reference time in the matrix clause is a consequent state of the asking, 
while the reference time in the embedded clause is a consequent state of the deciding; the 
perspective time in the embedded clause is the time of the decision; the perspective time 
in the matrix clause is the speech time. 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
                       Figure 7: Narrative effects in (26) 
 
speaker fills up glass ● _____________           ●  t0 = t P
1 (speech time) 
                   tP
2               t0 (speaker’s now)
 
                                 speaker says p ●                           
p: speaker wants  ////////////////////////////////////////… 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
         Figure 8: Narrative effects in (27) 
Fig. 7 illustrates that a situation in which the state described by the embedded predicate 
contains the attitude holder’s now is compatible with the requirement imposed by the 
“stative” past tense. Therefore, unlike the “eventive” past tense, the “stative” past tense 
does not override the default condition in (4). However, we should not conclude from this 
that the meaning of the “stative” past tense is inadequate. After all, it allows us to derive 
the overlapping and the non-overlapping interpretation in (26b) and (27b) respectively 
without any additional stipulations.
13 Moreover, it could very well be the case that an 
embedded  past  tense  overrides  the  default  condition  in  (4)  only  when  the  embedded 
predicate  is  eventive;  in  cases  where  the  embedded  predicate  is  stative,  the  default 
condition in (4) is overriden by some other means. Potential evidence for such a view 
comes  from  (29b),  where  the  embedded  stative  predicate  does  not  have  past  tense 
morphology (which, in Russian, signals the use of the non-past tense) yet we understand 
the state of Krylov’s house being on fire to hold at the time of Dudkin’s arrival.   
(29)  a. Dudkin pri-exa-l            domoj. 
    Dudkin PFV-go-PST.3s home 
    ‘Dudkin came home.’    
  b. On skaza-l             Anne, čto   požar v   dome  Krylova. 
    He 
PFVsay-PST.1s Anna  that  fire     in  house Krylov  
‘He told Anna that Krylov’s house was on fire.’ 
 
                                                 
13  Abusch  (1997)  showed  that  an  overlapping  interpretation  could  be  derived  without  invoking  a 
sequence of tense rule if the embedded past tense is interpreted deictically. The analysis advocated here 
shows that this interpretation could be derived without a sequence of tense rule even if the embedded past 
tense is bound.  Moreover, it seems reasonable that the theory advocated here could be extended to account 
for the oft-cited examples involving multiple embedding under would. For example, consider the discourse 
below: 
(v)  Mary  felt  very  tired  and  was  starting  to  get  a  little  bit  worried  about  how  much  longer  the 
procedure was going to go on, so she asked the nurse if the doctor could come back and check to 
see how much her cervix was dilated by that point. Mary thought that the doctor would say 
that she was 10 centimeters dilated and it was time to push (modified from the internet). (c.f. 
Mary thought: “The doctor will say that I am 10 centimeters dialed”) 
We could analyze the bolded indirect report as follows. The saying event is contained within a consequent 
state of the asking event, which in turn is contained within the state of being dialated 10 cm. This correctly 
predicts an overlapping interpretation. With regard to the tenses we could say the following: the “eventive” 
past tense on thought locates the thinking event prior to the speech time; would locates the saying event 
after the thinking event; the “stative” past tense on was 10 centimeters dialed overlaps the perspective time, 
which is presumably the run time of the asking event. 
Lev asks  ● _______       ●  t0 = tP
1 (speech time)             
    speaker decides ●_________ 
  t0 (speaker’s now) 
   tP
2        speaker says p  ●               
p: speaker wants //////////////////////////… Since it is highly unlikely that the non-past tense could override the default condition in 
(4), (29) suggests that this condition is overriden by some other means. If this is right, 
then  a  reasonable  hypothesis  would  be  to  say  that  whatever  overrides  the  default 
condition in (29) is also responsible for the override in (26b) and (27b). I leave this issue 
open for further research. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have argued that the rules that have been proposed to predict narrative 
progression  in  matrix  sentences  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  temporal  ordering  of 
eventualities described by an indirect report. I showed that it automatically follows from 
(2) that an overlapping interpretation is entailed by an indirect report with an embedded 
stative predicate if the reference time in the embedded clause overlaps the time of the 
matrix eventuality. This generalization is quite different from what has been proposed in 
the  literature  on  (Russian)  indirect  reports.  Previous  researchers  have  addressed  the 
question  of  what  allows  an  embedded  eventuality  to  overlap  in  time  with  a  matrix 
eventuality by appealing to properties of grammatical elements such as tense, aspect and 
verb. I attempted to show how previous generalizations—although incorrect—raise some 
interesting  questions  about  the  temporal  interpretation  of  indirect  reports  that  require 
further research.  
Moreover, I considered what narrative effects in indirect reports reveal about the 
meaning of the past tense. I presented novel data and argued that a theory which holds 
that the past tense requires a reference time to precede the local evaluation time (Standard 
Theory)  cannot  be  right  if  by  “reference  time”  we  mean  the  topical  interval  of  time 
previously introduced in discourse that accounts for narrative progression. I argued that a 
theory of tense that assumes a richer ontology of times—such as the one in Kamp and 
Reyle 1993—could be extended to account for the indirect report data that the Standard 
Theory  cannot.  Many  more  examples  of  indirect  reports—as  they  occur  within  a 
discourse—need to be considered to see if and how such a theory needs to be refined. 
The hope is that this paper provides a starting point in this regard. 
 
   
5.  Appendix: Overlapping interp. in Russian past-under-past indirect reports  
 
(30)  Anja   zameti-l-a                        ne   bez         udivlen’ja, čto   kamuški, ležaščie 
  Anna  
PFVnotice-PST.3s-FEM   not without   surprise     that  pebbles   lying 
na polu, odin za    drugim  prevrašča-l-i-s'              v       kroxotnye pirožki.           
  on floor one  after other     changeIPF-PST.3p-RFL  into  small        pies  
“Alice noticed, with some surprise, that the pebbles were all turning into little 
cakes as they lay on the floor” (Nabakov, Alice in Wonderland; Barensten 1996). 
(31)  V  1915 gody A.C. Buturlin   sta-l                         bolet’.     On, kak   vrač 
In 1915 year  A.C. Buturlin  
PFVbecome-PST.3s  sick.INF  he   how  doctor 
ne  bez          osnovanija predpolaga-l,        čto  u  nego  by-l                rak.  
not  without  basis          suspectIPF-PST.3s  that to him   beIPF-PST.3s  cancer  
“In 1915, A.C. Buturlin became sick. Being a doctor he suspected not without 
basis for doing so that he had cancer” (Tolstoy, Očerki bylogo; Costello 1961/62). (32)  Ona  duma-l-a,                     čto   Aleksej Aleksandrovič  xote-l                      
 She  thinkIPF-PST.3p-FEM  that  Alex    Alexandrovich   wantIPF-PST.3p    
čto-to        soobščit'    ej    prijatnoe dlja sebja  ob      etom dele      i       ona     
something announce  her  pleasant   for   self    about  this  matter  and   she        
voprosami  nave-l-a                        ego  na  rasskaz. 
questions
      PFVpoint-PST.3p-FEM him  to  story 
‘She thought that Alex Alexandrovich wanted to inform her of something about 
this matter that pleased him, and through questions, she lead him to tell her the 
story’ (Tolstoj, Anna Karenina). 
(33)  Egoruška,  kogda ešče ne   gore-l              koster i     možno   by-l-o               
  Egorushka when  still  not burnIPF-PST.3s fire    and possible beIPF-PST.3s-AGR  
videt’        daleko, zameti-l,               čto   točno    takoj-že staryj,  pokosivšijsja  
seeIPF-INF far
            PFVnotice-PST.3s that  exactly same        old    tilt 
krest   stoja-l               na drugoj storone bol’šoj dorogi. 
cross  standIPF-PST.3s on other    side      big       road 
‘When the fire was still not burning and it was possible to see afar, Egorushka 
noticed that the very same, old, tilted cross stood on the other side of the big road’ 
(Chexov, Step’; Costello 1961/62). 
 
 (34)  On  skaza-l,              čto   ona   žy-l-a                          blagodarja emu,  i      èto 
  He   
PFVsay-PST.3s  that  she    liveIPF-PST.3s-FEM   thanks        him   and  this  
otnima-l-o                  počti    vsju ego  ežednevnuju   energiju.   
take.awayIPF-PST-3s  almost  all   his   daily               energy. 
“He said that she was living thanks to him, and that this was taking away almost 
all of his daily energy” (Mirzuitova, Detstvo s Gurdžievym). 
(35)  On jasno    poni-l,                          čto  sejčas ot     nego treb-ova-los’   
  He  clearly 
PFVunderstand-PST.3s that now    from him  expect-IPF-PST.3s 
tol’ko odno. 
only   one 
“He clearly understood that there was only one thing expected from him now.” 
(Mel’čuk 1985: 264)  
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